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JURISDICTION
This Court granted Plaintiffs Petition for Permission to Appeal the June 20, 2008
Order of the Third Judicial District Court granting Defendant Northern Utah Healthcare
Corp. d/b/a St. Mark's Hospital's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Claim for Negligent
Credentialing. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 1953 § 78A3-102(3)(j) (West 2008).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is reviewed de novo, but should be upheld
where "it clearly appears that the plaintiff or plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief
under the facts alleged or under any state of facts they could prove to support their
claim;' Prows v. Utah, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991).
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the district court correctly ruled that Plaintiffs "negligent credentialing"
claim is precluded by the plain language of U.C.A. 1953 §§ 58-13-5, 58-13-4, 26-25-1,
and 26-25-3 that:
•

immunizes hospitals and hospital committees from liability arising from review of
"a health care provider's professional ethics, [and] medical competence" (§ 58-135);

•

immunizes hospitals and hospital committees from liability with respect to
"deliberations, decisions, or determinations" made in good faith and without
malice for the purpose of "evaluating] and improving] the quality of health care"

1

or "evaluating] or reviewing] the diagnoses or treatment of, or the performance
of health or hospital services to, patients within this state" (§ 58-13-4);
•

bars discovery or use in evidence of "[a] 11 information, interviews, reports,
statements, memoranda, and other data" provided to a hospital peer review
committee or any other hospital in-house staff committee for the purpose of
evaluating and improving hospital care (§ 26-25-3), and immunizing any person or
hospital who provides such information to such committees (§ 26-25-1)?
RELEVANT STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. 1953 §§ 26-25-1, 26-25-3, 58-13-4, and 58-13-5, are attached as

Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the June 20, 2008 Order of Judge Pat B. Brian, Third
Judicial District Court, granting Defendant Northern Utah Healthcare Corp. d/b/a St.
Mark's Hospital's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Claim for Negligent Credentialing.
Specifically, the district court found that U.C.A. 1953 § 58-13-5(7) ^clearly insulates a
hospital from negligence claims stemming from credentialing," by its express language
that aany hospital, other health care entity, or professional organization conducting or
sponsoring the review [is] immune from liability arising from participation in a review of
a health care provider's . . . 'medical competence.'" June 20, 2008 Ruling and Order, at
1. Citing the Fourth Judicial District Court's decision in Rosenlund v. Mountain View
Hospital, Inc., Case No. 030400671, Judge Brian stated that ^section 58-13-5(7)'s
language is ctoo apparent to be ignored . . . and appears to both contemplate and deny the
2

possibility of bringing a negligent credentialing cause of action,"' June 20, 2008 Ruling
and Order, at 1, Like other district courts who have ruled on this issue1, Judge Brian
further held that negligent credentialing claims are also barred by ~the broad immunities"
granted to hospitals in U.C.A. 1953 § 58-13-4 and § 26-25-1. Id.
On July 8, 2008, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal the June 20,
2008 Interlocutory Order ("Petition") in this Court.

On August 6, 2008, this Court

granted Plaintiffs Petition. (R. at 325).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 19, 2007, Plaintiff Tina Archuleta filed an amended complaint
alleging negligence and damages arising out of the medical care provided by Defendant
physicians R. Chad Halverson, M.D. and Steven Simper, M.D. while she was admitted to
St. Mark's Hospital ("St. MarkV) on or about August 4, 2005. Ms. Archuleta had been
a patient of Dr. Halverson long before her admission to St. Mark's. (R. at 286). On July
26, 2005, Dr. Halverson diagnosed Ms. Archuleta as suffering from bile gastritis. At that
time, Dr. Halverson recommended Ms, Archuleta undergo an exploratory laparotomy and
roux limb revision at St. Mark's on August 4, 2005. In addition to her allegations of

1

At least three other district courts have found that Utah law does not recognize a cause

of action for negligent credentialing. See Cuno v. G. Remington Brooks, M.D,, Case No.
050911340, Martinez v. James Tran, M.D. and IHC Health Services, Inc., Case No.
050400432 MP and Rosenlund v. Mountain View Hospital, Inc., Case No. 030400671,
attached as Addendum B.

3

medical negligence arising out of her planned August 4, 2005 exploratory laparotomy,
roux limb revision and subsequent treatment, Plaintiff also alleged a negligent
credentialing claim against St. Mark's for granting staff privileges to Drs. Simper2 and
Halverson. More specifically, Plaintiff alleged that

%c

St. Mark's failed to seek consult

when appropriate, inadequately trained healthcare provider employees, negligently
credentialed Drs. Simper and Halverson and generally fell below the standard of care
with regard to Plaintiff Tina Archuleta." As a result of this alleged negligence, plaintiff
alleges she was injured and suffered damages. (R. at 12).
On December 17, 2007, St. Mark's simultaneously filed its Answer to Plaintiffs
Amended Complaint and a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Claim for Negligent
Credentialing. (R. at 205-217).

It its Motion to Dismiss, St. Mark's argued that

Plaintiffs negligent credentialing claims should be dismissed because Utah law does not
recognize a claim for negligent credentialing and/or privileging. In support of its Motion,
St. Mark's attached the decisions of the three previously mentioned Utah district courts
that recently dismissed pending negligent credentialing claims. Each of these courts
found that negligent credentialing was not cognizable under Utah law, and was further
precluded by U.C.A. 1953 §§ 58-13-5, 58-13-4, and/or 26-25-1.

Dr. Simper was subsequently dismissed and his conduct and credentialing are no longer
at issue.

4

On June 20, 2008, Judge Pat Brian issued a ruling and order granting St. Mark's
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs negligent credentialing claims, (R. at 325), holding in
relevant part as follows:
Utah Code Annotated §58-13-5(7) clearly insulates a hospital from
negligence claims stemming from credentialing. Section 58-13-5(7)
provides: "any hospital, other health care entity, or professional
organization conducting or sponsoring the review [is] immune from
liability arising from participation in a review of a health care provider's . .
. "medical competence." The Court holds with Judge Stott in Rosenlund v.
Mountain View Hospital, Inc. (Ex. A to Defendant's Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Dismiss) that Section 58-13-5(7)'s language is "too
apparent to be ignored . . . and appears to both contemplate and deny the
possibility of bringing a negligent credentialing cause of action."
Additionally, the Court agrees with Defendant and the other district
courts who have ruled on this issue that Utah Code Annotated § 58-13-4
also grants immunity to health care facilities for claims such as this by
immunizing them for many categories of decisions and determinations.
Finally, the Court is further persuaded that negligent credentialing
does not exist because of the broad immunity granted to health facilities
under Utah Code Annotated § 26-25-1.
June 20, 2008 Ruling and Order of Judge Pat B. Brian, at 1.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs negligent credentialing claims
because: (1) the plain language of U.CA. 1953 §§

58-13-5, 58-13-4, and 26-25-1

demonstrate that Utah law does not permit a negligent credentialing cause of action
against a hospital; (2) the broad immunity against negligent credentialing claims provided
under these statutory provisions is consistent with the confidentiality provisions set forth
in U.CA. 1953 § 26-25-3 that apply to *cany legal proceeding of any kind or character";
and (3) the immunity provided under U.CA. 1953 §§ 58-13-4, 58-13-5 and 26-25-1 does
5

not violate the open courts or equal protection provisions of the Utah Constitution
because no cause of action for negligent credentialing existed when the immunity statutes
were enacted; because the immunity statutes and Utah law provide reasonable alternative
remedies; and because the statutory immunity and confidentiality provisions are a
reasonable means of encouraging frank, open and candid evaluations of physicians who
seek the issuance or reissuance of hospital privileges.
ARGUMENT
I.

AS A MATTER OF LAW, PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENT
CREDENTIALING CLAIM IS BARRED BY UTAH'S HEALTH
CARE PROVIDERS IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY ACT AND
UTAH'S CARE REVIEW STATUTE.
A. The Arguments Of Plaintiff And Her Amicus Ignore the Plain
Statutory Language Of The Immunity Statutes.
Plaintiff and her amicus curiae devote most of their briefs to anything but the plain

and clear language of the Utah statutes on which this case was decided below, and on
which it must be decided on appeal. Thus, their briefs address automobile and truck
drivers (PL Br. 4, 5, 13, 14), prior statutes that have been either amended or replaced
(Am. Br. 6-9,11-14), legal doctrines (e.g. charitable immunity) that no longer exist (PL
Br. 8, 12), inapplicable Restatement provisions (PL Br. 14, 15), and cases from other
states that do not have the comprehensive confidentiality and immunity statutes
pertaining to a hospital's physician credentialing process that are present in Utah (PL Br.
9, 20-21; Am. Br. 20-23). None of these irrelevant matters discussed by Plaintiff and her
amicus can change Utah statutory law, which, as four district courts have now held,
wC

clearly insulates the hospital from negligence claims stemming from credentialing" of
6

independent staff physicians who are neither employees nor agents of the hospital, but
who remain folly responsible for their conduct and subject to liability to any person
injured by their medical negligence. June 2, 2008 Ruling and Order, at 1.
As these four district courts have correctly ruled, this immunity grant is reflected
in a comprehensive statutory scheme in which the Utah legislature sought to encourage
frank, open, and candid peer review of a physician's competence and other matters
relating to his or her ability to deliver quality health care and services to hospital patients,
See Cannon v. Salt Lake Medical Center, 121 P.3d 74, 80 (Utah 2005); Benson by
Benson v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 866 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah 1993). To carry out and further
this laudable purpose, the statutes prohibit the "discovery, use, or receipt in evidence in
any legal proceeding of any kind or character" of "all information, interviews, reports,
statements, memorandums, or other data furnished" to any hospital committee involved
in any such a physician review process as well as "any findings or conclusions" reached
as a result of that process. U.C.A. § 26-25-3 (West 2008). By prohibiting these materials
from discovery, the legislature clearly recognized that ^public policy is best served by
fostering an atmosphere of professional candor which would be less likely to occur if
such information were discoverable." June 6, 2006 Order Granting Defendant IHC
Health Services, Inc's Motion to Dismiss in Martinez v. James Tran, M.D. and IHC
Health Services Inc., Case No. 050400432, at 3. Consistent with this purpose and broad
confidentiality grant, the statutes then immunize the individual participants, as well as the
hospital itself, from any liability claims arising from the deliberations, decisions or
determinations made as a result of this confidential physician review process or

7

participation therein - unless there is clear and convincing evidence that those involved
in the process acted with malice and in bad faith.

When it amended the immunity

statutes, the Legislature deliberately ''broadened the immunity language to make it clear
that it applies equally to hospitals and individuals involved in credentialing and
privileging doctors and evaluating health care." October 23, 2006 Ruling in Cuno v. G.
Remington Brooks, M.D., et ai, Case No. 050911340.
These are sound and sensible legislative enactments. Absent such immunity and
confidentiality provisions, the goal of the peer review process and the willingness of a
person to participate in the process could well be jeopardized. Other states with similar
confidentiality and/or immunity provisions likewise have sensibly held that negligent
credentialing claims cannot be brought against a hospital. See, Kauntz v. HCAHealthcare, LLC, 174 P.3d 813, 817-19 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007); St. Luke's Episcopal
Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W. 2d 503, 505-09 (Tex. 1997); Svindland v. A.l DuPont Hosp.,
2006 WL 3209953, at *2-4 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (applying Delaware law). As stated in a
comprehensive law review article, George E. Newton II, Maintaining the Balance:
Reconciling the Social and Judicial Costs of Medical Peer Review Protection, 52 Ala. L.
Rev. 723 (2001), u[tjhe immunization of committee members and affiliated institutions
from liability for their actions or statements performed within the scope and function of a
peer review committee is an important strength of medical review statutes" and "[i]n
order for these policy interests to mutually benefit from the existence of these laws,
courts must broadly apply the privileges and immunities provided by the laws of peer
review protection." Id. at 730, 742.
8

Nor do the Utah immunity statutes violate any provision of the Utah constitution.
Indeed, the only legitimate constitutional issues would be those that would arise if the
Utah statutes at issue were interpreted not to grant immunity for credentialing claims. In
such a case, the confidentiality provisions of the statute would still prevent the hospital
from introducing in evidence all of the ''information, interviews, reports, statements,
memoranda, or other data" on which its credentials committee relied in reaching its
credentialing decisions - thereby depriving a hospital of its fundamental rights to equal
protection and due process of the law in defending itself against an action for civil
damages. See Point I.D., infra.
This does not mean that hospitals or physicians are immunized from liability for
their negligent medical care or treatment rendered to any hospital patient. To the
contrary, the statutes expressly do "not relieve any healthcare provider from liability
incurred in providing professional care and treatment to any patient." Thus, in the case at
bar, St. Marks would be liable to Plaintiff for any proven allegation that its agents,
servants or employees rendered improper medical care to Ms. Archuleta. Likewise, Dr.
Halversen remains liable for any injuries sustained by Ms. Archuleta as a result of his
negligence.3

J

That liability will be determined pursuant to the valid and enforceable arbitration

agreement between Plaintiff and Dr. Halversen. (PI. Br. 3).

9

B. This Case Should Be Decided Solely On The Basis Of The Utah
Immunity Statutes.
When determining the meaning of a statute, the Court should begin with the
statutes plain language. Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998). Applying the
general rules of statutory construction, this Court has stated that its ''primary goal . . . is
to evince vthe true intent and purpose of the Legislature [as expressed through] the plain
language of the Act," Carter v. University of Utah Medical Center, 150 P.3d 467, 469
(Utah 2006), by rendering "all parts [of the statute] relevant and meaningful" and
avoiding "interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative."
Id. The Court should "presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and give
effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning. We must be guided
by the law as it is . . . . When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to
mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction," Zoll & Branch, P.C. v.
Asay, 932 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah 1997). In such an instance, "no other interpretive tools
are needed in analyzing the statute." State v. Barrett, 127 P.2d 682 (Utah 2005). "Only
when we find ambiguity in the statute's plain language need we seek guidance from the
legislative history and relevant policy considerations." World Peace Movement v.
Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994). Because U.C.A. §§ 58-13-4.
58-13-5, 26-25-1 and 26-25-3 are clear and unambiguous in the immunity/confidentiality
granted health care providers, including hospitals, with respect to their deliberations,
decisions and determinations involved in their review of the medical competence of a
physician providing care to hospital patients, this Court should affirm the ruling of Judge

10

Brian who correctly held (as have three other district courts) that these statutes clearly
and unambiguously bar any action for negligent credentialing in Utah.
C. The Plain Language Of §§ 58-13-4 and 58-13-5 Bar Claims For
Negligent Credentialing.
The Utah Peer Review Statute, U.C.A. §§ 58-13-1 et seq., and the Care Review
Statute, U.C.A. §§ 26-25-1 et seq., individually and collectively, make it clear that St.
Mark's is immunized against Plaintiffs negligent credentialing claim. U.C.A. §§ 58-134(2) and 58-13-5(7), state in pertinent part:
(2) Health care providers serving in the following capacities and
the organizations or entities sponsoring these activities are immune
from liability with respect to deliberations, decisions, or
determinations made or information furnished in good faith and
without malice:
(a) serving on committees:
(ii) established to evaluate and improve the quality
of health care or determine whether provided
health care was necessary, appropriate, properly
performed, or provided at a reasonable cost; . . . .
(iv) that are ethical standards review committees; or
(v) that are similar to committees listed in this
Subsection (2) and that are established by any
hospital, professional association, the Utah Medical
Association, or one of its component medical societies
to evaluate or review the diagnosis or treatment of, or
the performance of health or hospital services to,
patients within this state;
***

(7) An individual who is a member of a hospital administration,
board, committee, department, medical staff, or professional
organization of health care providers is, and any hospital, other
health care entity, or professional organization conducting or
sponsoring the review, immune from liability arising from
participation in a review of a health care provider's professional
ethics, medical competence, moral turpitude, or substance abuse.

11

U.C.A. 1953 §§ 58-13-4(2) and 58-13-5(7)(West 2008)(emphasis added).
By their plain language, Utah Code Ann. § 58-13-4(2) and 58-13-5(7) grant broad
immunity to health care providers4, such as St. Mark's Hospital, from liability for its
participation in activities that constitute the essence of the physician credentialing
process, i.e., the evaluation and peer review of a physician's "professional ethics, medical
competence, moral turpitude" and a physician's overall "performance of health or
hospital services to, patients within this state." See, U.C.A. 1953 §§ 58-13-4(2) and 5813-5(7).

Such a competence evaluation and review is the core of any credentialing

decision to issue or renew a physician's hospital privileges, and the statutory immunity
granted for these activities is "too apparent to be ignored." June 20, 2008 Ruling and
Order of Judge Brian, at 1 (citing September 21, 2006 Ruling by Judge Gary D. Stott on
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in Rosenlund v. Mountain View Hsopital, Inc., Case No.
030400671).
Plaintiffs and the Amicus's assertion that these broad immunity grants are limited
to suits brought by physicians disgruntled by a credentialing decision (PL Br. 17; Am. Br.
16) is unfounded. No such limitation is expressed or implied. To the contrary, the broad
statutory immunities granted to credentialing decisions are stated without limitation or
condition - as long as the decisions are made in good faith and without malice.
Again, it is the statutory language that controls and Plaintiffs and Amicus's
attempt to add statutory limitations and conditions that do not exist must be rejected. Neel

4

Health care providers are defined to include hospitals. U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-3-403.

12

v. State, 889 P.2d 922, 926 (Utah 1995) ("We have 'no power to rewrite a statute to make
it conform to an intention not expressed,"' quoting In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d
633, 640 (Utah 1988)).
D. The Immunity Provisions in §§ 58-13-4 and 58-13-5 Are Consistent
With The Immunity and Confidentiality Provisions Found In §§ 26-251 and 26-25-3,
The immunity provisions found in §§ 58-13-4 and 58-13-5 are consistent with the
immunity and confidentiality provisions set forth in §§ 26-25-1 and 26-25-3 and further
support a finding that the immunity statutes individually and collectively bar an action by
a patient for negligent credentialing. U.C.A. 1953 § 26-25-1 states in pertinent part:
(1) Any person, health facility, or other organization may, without
incurring liability, provide the following information to the persons
and entities described in Subsection (2):
(a) information as determined by the state registrar of vital records
appointed under Title 26, Chapter 2, Utah Vital Statistics Act;
(b) interviews;
(c) reports;
(d) statements;
(e) memoranda;
(f) familial information; and
(g) other data relating to the condition and treatment of any person.
(2) The information described in Subsection (1) may be provided to:
(a) the department and local health departments;
(b) the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health within the
Department of Human Services;
(c) scientific and health care research organizations affiliated with
institutions of higher education;
(d) the Utah Medical Association or any of its allied medical
societies;
(e) peer review committees;
(f) professional review organizations;
(g) professional societies and associations; and
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(h) any health facility's in-house staff committee for the uses
described in Subsection (3).
(3) The information described in Subsection (1) may be provided for the
following purposes:
(a) study and advancing medical research, with the purpose of
reducing the incidence of disease, morbidity, or mortality; or
(b) the evaluation and improvement of hospital and health care
rendered by hospitals, health facilities, or health care providers.
(4) Any person may, without incurring liability, provide information,
interviews, reports, statements, memoranda, or other information
relating to the ethical conduct of any health care provider to peer
review committees, professional societies and associations, or any inhospital staff committee to be used for purposes of intraprofessional
society or association discipline.
(5) No liability may arise against any person or organization as a result
of:
(a) providing information or material authorized in this section;
(b) releasing or publishing findings and conclusions of groups referred to in
this section to advance health research and health education; or
(c) releasing or publishing a summary of these studies in accordance with
this chapter.
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-25-1 (West 2008)(emphasis added).
After immunizing from liability all persons who provide information to hospital
committees, such as credentialing committees, involved in "peer review" and the
"evaluation and improvement of hospital health care," U.C.A. § 26-25-3 makes clear that
such information may not be disclosed "in any legal proceeding of any kind." U.C.A. §
26-25-3, states in pertinent part:
All information, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda, or other data
furnished by reason of this chapter, and any findings or conclusions
resulting from those studies are privileged communications and are not
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subject to discovery, use, or receipt in evidence in any legal proceeding
of any kind or character.
U.C.A. § 26-25-3 (West 2008)(emphasis added).
If any statutory provision squarely rebukes Plaintiffs claim that the immunity and
confidentiality provisions in §§ 58-13-4, 58-13-5, and 26-25-1 do not apply to patients'
suits for negligent credentialing, this is it. Indeed, if Plaintiff s and the Amicus's position
were accepted, this confidentiality provision would still remain in full force and effect.
Thus, Plaintiff could not discover and St. Mark's could not reveal, and neither side could
introduce in evidence, 'information, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda, or other
data" on which St. Mark's relied in issuing privileges to Dr. Halverson.5

Thus, as

recently recognized by the Colorado Court of Appeals, such a confidentiality provision
confirms the legislature's intent to bar negligent credentialing claims.
[I]t would be inconsistent to preclude a patient's discovery of peer review
documents dealing with an allegedly negligent physician, but still allow
that patient's negligent credentialing claim to be asserted. If such a claim
were allowed, both patients and hospitals would be at distinct
disadvantages in proving their claims or defenses.

3

In Benson by Benson v. I.H.C. Hospitals, Inc. 866 P.2d 537 (Utah 1993), this Court

stated that U.C.A. § 26-25-3 precludes the admission in evidence of documents prepared
specifically to be submitted for review purposes. The Court in Benson noted that U.C.A.
§ 26-25-3 did not preclude the discovery of any such documents or other information
pertaining to the review process. Subsequent to Benson, the Legislature amended § 2625-3 to state that such documents and other information uare not subject to discovery.v
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Kauntz v. HCA-Healthone, LLC, 174 P.3d 813, 818 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007). Moreover,
allowing a negligent credentialing action to proceed in the face of such a prohibition
against discovery and the receipt into evidence of the very materials on which St. Mark's
relied in making its credentialing decisions would deprive St. Mark's of the ability to
defend itself, in plain violation of its constitutional right to due process and equal
protection under the law. See Utah Constitution Art. I, §§ 7, 24; U.S. Constitution,
Amendments V, XIV. It is a fundamental proposition of Utah law that "it is the duty of
this Court to construe a statute to avoid constitutional infirmities whenever possible.
[The Court] must wadopt that construction which will save the statute from constitutional
infirmity." State v. Lindquist, 674 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 1983).

Here, the only

construction that avoids constitutional infirmities is that which recognizes the clear
language of the statute and enforces the intended bar against claims for negligent
credentialing.
E. Nothing In The Immunity Statutes Bars Claims For Negligent Care
And Treatment, But This Is Not Such A Claim.
Although the statutory immunities discussed above bar claims for negligent
credentialing, the immunity statutes do not prohibit suits "encompassing the whole field
of negligence law" against a hospital defendant. PL Br. at 19. Indeed, § 58-13-4(3)
expressly udoes not relieve any health care provider from liability incurred in providing
professional

care and treatment to any patientT

U.C.A.

§ 58-13-4(3)(West

2008)(emphasis added). As an employer of various medical personnel, including nurses
and even in some instances physicians, a hospital can still be held liable for the care and
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treatment of patients by its employees under traditional respondeat superior negligence
principles.
Indeed, in the Utah hospital cases cited by Plaintiff (PL Br. 13) as establishing that
a hospital has a direct and independent responsibility to its patients in its credentialing
decisions, this is exactly what occurred. See Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hospital, 830 P.2d
270 (Utah \992){res ipsa loquitur claims alleging instrument or thing allegedly causing
injury was in control of physician and/or hospital employees); Chapman v. Primary
Children's Hospital, 784 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1989) (patient brought suit against physician
and hospital, alleging in part, negligence on behalf of the hospital's employee nurse);
George v. LD Hospital, 797 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1990) (wrongful death suit alleging failure
of hospital employee nurse to notify of decedent's deteriorating condition proximate
cause of death); Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, 791 P.2d 193 (Utah
1990) (res ipsa loquitur claims alleging instrument or thing allegedly causing injury was
in control of physician and/or hospital employees).
Thus, the fact that a physician's or a hospital's professional care and treatment to a
patient may be subjected to peer review or other committee review does not immunize
the physician or the hospital from suits alleging that such professional care and treatment
was performed in a negligent manner. But this immunity exception has no application
here. St. Mark's is not sued in this case for "providing professional care and treatment"
to Plaintiff. Instead, St. Mark's is sued for its credentialing decisions with regard to Dr.
Halverson prior to the time that Dr. Halverson provided the "professional care and
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treatment" about which Plaintiff complains and for which Dr. Halversen has no
immunity.
II.

AFFORDING HOSPITALS IMMUNITY AGAINST CLAIMS FOR
NEGLIGENT CREDENTIALING DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
OPEN COURTS OR EQUAL PROTECTION PROVISIONS OF THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION.
When it enacted U.C.A. 58-13-4, 58-13-5, and 26-25-1, immunizing hospitals

against negligent credentialing claims, the Utah Legislature acted well within the limits
drawn by the Utah Constitution. Contrary to the contentions in Plaintiffs brief (PI. Br.
22), neither the open courts clause nor the equal protection provisions of the Utah
Constitution were violated by the Legislature's enactment of these immunity provisions.
The Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution provides:
All courts shall be open and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law,
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
Utah Const. Art. I, § 11.
This Court has stated that while "the open courts clause protects both substantive
and procedural rights, the clause is not an absolute guarantee of all substantive rights."
Tindley v. Salt Lake City School District, 116 P.3d 295, 300 (Utah 2005). To the
contrary, the Legislature "has great latitude in defining, changing, and modernizing the
law, and in doing so may create new rules of law and abrogate old ones." Berry v. Beach
Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670, 676 (Utah 1985). Thus, this Court has determined that a
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given statutory enactment that eliminates or precludes a cause of action will not violate
the open courts clause if any one of the following three conditions are met:
1)

the statute does not abrogate an existing legal remedy, Wood v. University
of Utah Medical Center, 67 P.3d 436, 442 (Utah 2003); or

2)

the statute provides an effective and reasonable alternative remedy, Berry,
supra, 717P.2dat680;or

3)

the statute's elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or
unreasonable means to achieve the elimination of a social or economic evil,
Berry, supra, 1X1 P.2d at 680.

While a statute that satisfies any one of the above tests passes constitutional
muster, the Utah statutes that immunize hospitals against negligent credentialing claims,
i.e. §§ 58-13-4, 58-13-5, and 26-25-1, satisfy all three of these tests.
A. The Open Courts Clause Was Not Violated Because Negligent
Credentialing Was Not An Existing Cause Of Action At The Time
U.C.A. §§ 58-13-4, 58-13-5, 26-25-1, Or 26-25-3 Were Enacted.
Before the Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution is implicated, it must be
established that the enacted legislation either in whole or in part abrogates an existing
right of action. Tinley, 116 P.3d at 300; See Cruz v. Wright, 765 P.2d 869, 870-71 (Utah
1988).

In this case, the district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs "negligent

credentialing" claim because the Legislature did not eliminate the existing "common law
causes of action for negligence against a hospital," but rather only "sought to abrogate the
extended duty" sought to be imposed on hospitals through a negligent credentialing cause
of action. June 24, 2008 Ruling and Order at p. 1.
In 2003, this Court addressed the "existing remedy or cause of action" requirement
in Wood v. University of Utah Medical Center, 67 P.3d 436 (Utah 2003). In Wood, the
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plaintiffs alleged that the Utah Wrongful Life Act, enacted in 1983, which prohibits
lawsuits for wrongful birth, violated the open courts clause. In rejecting the plaintiffs
open courts clause claim, this Court stated that
"[ijn the absence of a declaration by this court either recognizing, or
refusing to recognize, a cause of action for wrongful birth, the legislature
set forth the law, declaring that claims for wrongful birth would not be
recognized in Utah in enacting [the Wrongful Life Act]. As a result,
regardless of whether such an action was recognized by other states at the
time, because a cause of action for wrongful birth did not exist in Utah at
the time the statute was enacted in 1983, the legislature did not abrogate an
existing legal remedy. In sum, because the statute did not abrogate an
existing legal remedy, and because the Berry test begins with the
presumption that a legal remedy was abolished, the legislation satisfies the
first Berry hurdle. Because we conclude that no existing remedy was
abrogated, we need not apply the second part of the Berry test." Id. at 443.
The same reasoning applies here. To the best of St. Mark's research, there is no
prior declaration by this Court ''either recognizing, or refusing to recognize, a cause of
action for" negligent credentialing; and Plaintiff cites none. Plaintiff argues Utah has
"recognized corporate negligence for hospitals" since 1907, and that negligent
credentialing "simply represents the particular set of facts and circumstances under which
a hospital may be held liable for failing to exercise due care in selecting and retaining
competent surgeons." PL Brief at 12, 25. In support of her argument, Plaintiff cites to
Gitzhoffen v. Sister of Holy Cross Hosp., 88 P. 691 (Utah 1907) and Sessions v. Thomas
D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass 'n, 78 P.2d 645 (Utah 1938), for the proposition that Utah
has acknowledged that a hospital may still be "guilty of negligence in the selection of the
physician or servant." PL Br. at 11. Plaintiffs reliance on Gitzhoffen and Sessions, is
misplaced for several reasons.

First, and most importantly, neither Gitzhoffen nor
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Sessions establish that Utah recognizes "corporate negligence" or institutional
negligence, much less negligent credentialing, as an existing cause of action; On the
contrary, Gitzhoffen addresses the issues of what evidence is determinative of a hospital's
status as a charitable organization, and whether the evidence in that trial was sufficient to
establish the hospital's liability under traditional respondeat superior principles.
Similarly, Sessions involved an issue of whether the amended complaint sufficiently pled
facts establishing that the defendant hospital was not a charitable organization entitled to
immunity from liability for the negligent actions of its employees - also traditional
respondeat superior negligence principles. Thus, the theory of direct corporate hospital
negligence or institutional negligence was not involved.
Moreover, the statements from Gitzhoffen and Sessions, quoted by Plaintiff, refer
to liability in the selection of an employee physician or servant, not an independent
contractor physician.

Neither Gitzhoffen nor Sessions are examples of instances where

this Court has imposed administrative or managerial liability on a hospital for the conduct
of an independent contractor physician.

Nor do any other of Plaintiffs cases, e.g.,

Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hospital, 830 P.2d 270 (Utah 1992), Chapman v. Primary
Children's Hospital, 784 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1989), George v. LD Hospital, 797 P.2d 1117
(Utah 1990) or Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, 791 P.2d 193 (Utah
1990) do so. Thus, all the district courts deciding this issue have correctly held that Utah
law has never previously recognized a cause of action for negligent credentialing of an
independent contractor physician.

Therefore, under Wood, the statutes immunizing
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hospitals against negligent credentialing claims do not abrogate an existing legal remedy
and there is no Open Courts Clause violation for this reason alone.6
B. The Utah Statutes Immunizing Hospitals From Negligent
Credentialing Claims Leave Patients With Reasonable Alternative
Remedies.
Even in instances where the Legislature abrogates an existing right of action, this
Court has established the following test for determining whether a legislative enactment
satisfies the open courts clause:
[Sjection 11 is satisfied if the law provides an injured person an effective
and reasonable alternative remedy uby due course of law" for vindication of
his constitutional interest. The benefit provided by the substitute must be
substantially equal in value or other benefit to the remedy abrogated . . .
[I]f there is no substitute or alternative remedy provided, abrogation of the
remedy . . . may be justified only if there is a clear social or economic evil
to be eliminated and the elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an
arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the objective.
Berry ex rel Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985)
Here, while the immunity statutes at issue do not abrogate an existing right of
action, they provide Plaintiff with effective and reasonable alternative remedies. Most
obvious is the alternative remedy of recovering from Dr. Halverson for any injuries cause

6

Plaintiff cites cases from Georgia and Ohio, (PI. Br. 21, n.54) as examples of states who

have interpreted their statutes as not eliminating claims for negligent credentialing. But in
contrast to Utah, Georgia and Ohio case law had expressly recognized negligent
credentialing claims. Albainv. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1044-1047 (Ohio 1990);
Joinerv. Mitchell County Hosp. Autk, 186 S.E.2d 307, 309 (Ga. 1971).
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by his negligence in providing professional care and treatment to the Plaintiff. As stated
by the Colorado Court of Appeals in Kauntz v HCA-Healthone, LLC, 174 P.3d 813
(Colo. Ct. App. 2007):
While patients may not sue hospitals under these circumstances, they
nevertheless retain the right to sue negligent physicians personally. Thus,
barring negligent credentialing damage claims in these circumstances does
not leave a negligently injured patient without a remedy.
Kauntz, 174 P.3d at 819.
Furthermore, U.C.A. § 58-13-4(2) states that health care providers are only
immune from liability with respect to their deliberations, decisions or determinations
made 4in good faith and without malice." U.C.A. § 58-13-4(2) (West 2008). Thus, the
immunity from negligent credentialing causes of action provided by U.C.A. § 58-13-4
and 58-13-5 is not unlimited. A plaintiff may potentially assert a claim for "negligent
credentialing" where a showing of bad faith and/or malice can be made. Given these two
alternative remedies, U.C.A. §§ 58-13-4 and 58-13-5 do not leave a negligently injured
patient without a remedy.
Finally, even if negligent credentialing was a recognized pre-existing cause of
action (it is not), and even if the immunity statutes did not provide plaintiff with any
alternative remedies (they do), there would still be no constitutional violation because the
immunity statutes serve to create a reasonable, non-arbitrary means to encourage
hospitals and hospital review committees to engage in full, frank, open and candid
evaluation and peer review of physicians during the credentialing process. Berry, 1X1
P.2dat680.
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C. U.C.A. §§ 58-13-4, 58-13-5, And 26-25-1 Do Not Violate The Equal
Protection Clause Of The Utah Constitution.
Plaintiff argues that construing U.C.A. §§ 58-13-4, 58-13-5 and 26-25-1 u to
eliminate negligence claims premised on credentialing while allowing other claims based
on different bases for negligence," offends the equal protection granted in Article I,
Section 24 of the Utah Constitution. PL Br. at 25. Such an equal protection challenge
fails if the subject legislation "(1) *s reasonable, (2) has more than a speculative tendency
to further the legislative objective and, in fact, substantially furthers a valid legislative
purpose, and (3) is reasonably necessary to further a legitimate legislative goal." Judd v.
Drezga, 103 P.3d 135, 141 (Utah 2004).

Although the elimination of claims premised

on credentialing effects a small class of plaintiffs, the immunity provided is: 1)
reasonable; 2) it substantially furthers the legislative objective of encouraging hospitals
and hospital review committees to engage in full, frank, open and candid evaluation and
peer review of physicians during the credentialing process; and 3) it is reasonably
necessary to further that legislative goal because without it, physicians and other potential
members of peer review committees would be reluctant to sit on any such committee,
much less provide open and candid evaluation of their peers for fear of subjecting
themselves, and/or the hospital itself, to lawsuits premised on their participation and
credentialing decisions. As this Court stated in Judd, u[w]hen attempting to resolve
problems of policy, the legislature is inevitably forced to draw lines." Judd, 103 P.3d at
143. While the immunity statutes prevent Plaintiffs negligent credentialing claim, it "is
a policy choice made by the legislative branch" and their purpose in doing so is a valid

24

and legitimate one.

Because the immunity bar is a reasonably necessary means of

achieving the legislative purpose of encouraging open, frank and candid peer review
without the fear of retribution and lawsuits, and it actually and substantially furthers that
purpose, it is permissible under Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the immunity and confidentiality provisions set forth in
U.C.A. §§ 58-13-4, 58-13-5, 26-25-1 and 26-25-3 represent a comprehensive and
constitutional statutory scheme in which the Utah Legislature sought to improve
healthcare within the State by encouraging hospitals and hospital peer review committees
to engage in full, frank, open and candid evaluation of physicians' competence and other
matters during credentialing proceedings.

The district court correctly applied these

statutory immunity provisions in holding that Utah law does not recognize a cause of
action for "negligent credentialing." Accordingly, this Court should affirm the ruling of
the Third Judicial District Court granting Defendant Northern Utah Healthcare Corp.,
d/b/a St. Mark's Hospital's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Claim for Negligent
Credentialing, finding that as a matter of law, Utah does not recognize claims for
negligent credentialing.
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Respectfully submitted,

HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC

One ojythe attorney'^foHNorthern Utah
Healthcare Corp. d/b/a St. Mark's Hospital
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58-13-4. Liability immunity for health care providers on committees - Evaluating
and approving medical care.
(1) As used in this section, "health care provider" has the same meaning as in Section 78B3-403
(2) Health care providers serving in the following capacities and the organizations or entities
sponsoring these activities are immune from liability with respect to deliberations, decisions, or
determinations made or information furnished in good faith and without malice:
(a) serving on committees:
(i) established to determine if hospitals and long-term care facilities are being used
properly;
(ii) established to evaluate and improve the quality of health care or determine whether
provided health care was necessary, appropriate, properly performed, or provided at a
reasonable cost;
(iii) functioning under Pub. L. No. 89-97 or as professional standards review organizations
under Pub. L. No. 92-603;
(iv) that are ethical standards review committees, or
(v) that are similar to committees listed in this Subsection (2) and that are established by
any hospital, professional association, the Utah Medical Association, or one of its component
medical societies to evaluate or review the diagnosis or treatment of, or the performance of
health or hospital services to, patients within this state;
(b) members of licensing boards established under Title 58, Occupations and Professions,
to license and regulate health care providers; and
(c) health care providers or other persons furnishing information to those committees, as
required by law, voluntarily, or upon official request.
(3) This section does not relieve any health care provider from liability incurred in providing
professional care and treatment to any patient.
(4) Health care providers serving on committees or providing information described in this
section are presumed to have acted in good faith and without malice, absent clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary.
Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
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58-13-5. Information relating to adequacy and quality of medical care -- Immunity
from liability.
(1) As used in this section, "health care provider" has the same meaning as defined in
Section 78B-3-403.
(2) (a) The division, and the boards within the division that act regarding the health care
providers defined in this section, shall adopt rules to establish procedures to obtain information
concerning the quality and adequacy of health care rendered to patients by those health care
providers.
(b) It is the duty of an individual licensed under Title 58, Occupations and Professions, as a
health care provider to furnish information known to him with respect to health care rendered to
patients by any health care provider licensed under Title 58, Occupations and Professions, as
the division or a board may request during the course of the performance of its duties.
(3) A health care facility as defined in Section 26-21-2 which employs, grants privileges to,
or otherwise permits a licensed health care provider to engage in licensed practice within the
health care facility, and any professional society of licensed health care providers, shall report
any of the following events in writing to the division within sixty days after the event occurs
regarding the licensed health care provider:
(a) terminating employment of an employee for cause related to the employee's practice as
a licensed health care provider;
(b) terminating or restricting privileges for cause to engage in any act or practice related to
practice as a licensed health care provider;
(c) terminating, suspending, or restricting membership or privileges associated with
membership in a professional association for acts of unprofessional, unlawful, incompetent, or
negligent conduct related to practice as a licensed health care provider;
(d) subjecting a licensed health care provider to disciplinary action for a period of more than
30 days;
(e) a finding that a licensed health care provider has violated professional standards or
ethics;
(f) a finding of incompetence in practice as a licensed health care provider;
(g) a finding of acts of moral turpitude by a licensed health care provider; or
(h) a finding that a licensed health care provider is engaged in abuse of alcohol or drugs.
(4) This section does not prohibit any action by a health care facility, or professional society
comprised primarily of licensed health care providers to suspend, restrict, or revoke the
employment, privileges, or membership of a health care provider.
(5) The data and information obtained in accordance with this section is classified as a
"protected" record under Title 63G, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and Management
Act.
(6) (a) Any person or organization furnishing information in accordance with this section in
response to the request of the division or a board, or voluntarily, is immune from liability with
respect to information provided in good faith and without malice, which good faith and lack of
malice is presumed to exist absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
(b) The members of the board are immune from liability for any decisions made or actions
taken in response to information acquired by the board if those decisions or actions are made
in good faith and without malice, which good faith and lack of malice is presumed to exist
absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
(7) An individual who is a member of a hospital administration, board, committee,
department, medical staff, or professional organization of health care providers is, and any
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hospital, other health care entity, or professional organization conducting or sponsoring the
review, immune from liability arising from participation in a review of a health care provider's
professional ethics, medical competence, moral turpitude, or substance abuse.
(8) This section does not exempt a person licensed under Title 58, Occupations and
Professions, from complying with any reporting requirements established under state or federal
law.
Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
Amended by Chapter 382, 2008 General Session
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26-25-1. Authority to provide data on treatment and condition of persons to
designated agencies - Immunity from liability.
(1) Any person, health facility, or other organization may, without incurring liability, provide
the following information to the persons and entities described in Subsection (2):
(a) information as determined by the state registrar of vital records appointed under Title 26,
Chapter 2, Utah Vital Statistics Act;
(b) interviews;
(c) reports;
(d) statements;
(e) memoranda;
(f) familial information; and
(g) other data relating to the condition and treatment of any person.
(2) The information described in Subsection (1) may be provided to:
(a) the department and local health departments;
(b) the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health within the Department of Human
Services;
(c) scientific and health care research organizations affiliated with institutions of higher
education;
(d) the Utah Medical Association or any of its allied medical societies;
(e) peer review committees;
(f) professional review organizations;
(g) professional societies and associations; and
(h) any health facility's in-house staff committee for the uses described in Subsection (3).
(3) The information described in Subsection (1) may be provided for the following purposes:
(a) study and advancing medical research, with the purpose of reducing the incidence of
disease, morbidity, or mortality; or
(b) the evaluation and improvement of hospital and health care rendered by hospitals,
health facilities, or health care providers.
(4) Any person may, without incurring liability, provide information, interviews, reports,
statements, memoranda, or other information relating to the ethical conduct of any health care
provider to peer review committees, professional societies and associations, or any in-hospital
staff committee to be used for purposes of intraprofessional society or association discipline.
(5) No liability may arise against any person or organization as a result of:
(a) providing information or material authorized in this section;
(b) releasing or publishing findings and conclusions of groups referred to in this section to
advance health research and health education; or
(c) releasing or publishing a summary of these studies in accordance with this chapter.
(6) As used in this chapter:
(a) "health care provider" has the meaning set forth in Section 78B-3-403; and
(b) "health care facility" has the meaning set forth in Section 26-21-2.
Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
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26-25-3. Information considered privileged communications.
All information, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda, or other data furnished by
reason of this chapter, and any findings or conclusions resulting from those studies are
privileged communications and are not subject to discovery, use, or receipt in evidence in any
legal proceeding of any kind or character.
Amended by Chapter 201, 1996 General Session
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Paul D, Van Komen (7332)
BURJHDtB&WIOTE
Attorneys for IFIC Health Services, Inc,
1400 Key BanlcTowtf
50 South Main Street
Sjilt Lake City, UTS4144
Telephone: (801>3$p*7000

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PETE MARTINEZ and RITA MARTINEZ,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT fflC
HEALTH SERVICES, INC.'S MOTION
TO DISMISS

vs.

Case No, 050400432 MP

JAMES TRAN, M.D. md mc HEALTH
SERVICES, INC.,

Judge Steven L. Hansen
Division 4

Defendants,
This matter cauie before the Court on May 17,2006 for hearing on defendant H C Health
Services, Inc OHC") Motion to Dismiss, dated Mer&h 20> 2006. At the hearing, Paul D, Van
Krnnen of Burbidge & White represented JHQ Scott A. DuBofc of Snell & Wllmer represented
Dr. Jaraes Tran; md Cladc Nowhall of LAW Office* afClaxk NwfcaU represented the plaintiffs.
Having:heard oral argument from counsel, and having considered the memoranda
submitted by the parties, and being fully advised In the premises, the Ciourt finds merit in JHC's
arguments regarding the plaintiffs' only cause of action against IHC, the third cemae of action of

the complaint titled 'Negligent Supervision, Credentialing and PrivUeging-IHC Health Services,
Inc,*'
The Court finds (hat by enacting Utah's health om and peer review statute, Utah Code
Ann,§ 26-25-1 ot seq,, the legislatuxe has specified that any information and materials relating to
health care review and peer review are not discoverable, and cannot be used or admitted as
evidence in any legal proceeding. The legislature's intent appears to be broad and sweeping
based on (he statutory language that the privilege pertains to information including interviews/ 7
'tepartE," "statements," itiucmorandn'7 and "other data relating to th£ condition wd treatment of
any person" that i$ utilized in "the evaluation and improvement of hospital and health care
rendered by hospitals, health fhclHties, or health care providers," Utah Code Ana § 26-25-1,
The supervision, credentialing and privileging of a physician comes within this broad privilege
and the exclusion of$ucb privileged information from discovery and receipt into evidence,
Furthermore, Utah Code Amu § 58-134 grants wwmisty to health care providers, such
as IHC, against the type of claims found in the plaintiffs' third cause of action for negligent
supervision, credentialing and privileging* Utah Code Ann. § 58-13-5fclsoprovidoe immunity to
this Defendant from liability in reviewing a care provider's medical competence such as Dr.
Trap,
An individual who is a member of a hospital administration^ board,
committee, department, medical sbrff, ox professional organization
of health care providers is, and any hospital, cihtr health care
entity, or professional organization conducting- or sponsoring the

*2-

review, immune from Habilityorisfug from participation ID p
revive of a health c^re provider's professional ettucgKrnM<G?l
ponty^fepce, moral turpitude, or substance abuse,
Utah Code Ann. § 58-13-5(7) (emphasis added).
The legislative protection of the supervision, credcntialiag and privileging process is an
important element in enabling health cere provider* like IHC and those who participate in such
processes to evaluate md improve the quality of care provided The Utah legislature determined
thai this information is protected torn discovery and that health cere providers are immune from
liability for conducting such activities. This determination recognizee that publio policy is best
semd by fostering an atmosphere of profession^ candor which would be less likely to ooour if
such information were discoverable, Because the legislature has granted broad immunity for
such activities, plaintiffs' third cause of Ration fails as a matter of law.
For these reasons, as well as the reasons set forth in the memoranda of defendant IHC, the
Court finds that die plaintiffs* third cause of action for negligent supervision, credentialing and
privileging against IHC Health Sendees, lap should be dismissed,
Therefore, IT IS HERBBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant,
IHC Health Services, Inc/s Motion to Dismiss the plaintiffs' third cause of action, which is
plaintiff only cause of action against IHC Health Services, Inc., should be and the some IS
HEREBY GRANTED, and the third causa of action of plaintiffs' complaint IS DISMISSED,

-3-

»" ^,0 ™ en ' 1,h6i^ ° o^pW ° ,
b„tataUbcKq«.o«»«.o*r*c.»of^.8«'HCH^ Serine.
WIr Ho^rr F RE ] UB.cE.T te p.»i».l ffI ».y.«*«-««

DATED this j&_ day of
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toC

Fe irthJuau.i'^i&^ctC
otuianC «nty, State 01
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ^-;Z/^4L!£^—
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Kevin Rosenlund and Diane Rosenlund,,
Plaintiffs,

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO DISMISS

vs.
Case No. 030400671
Mountain View Hospital, Inc.,
Judge Gary D. Stott
Defendant,.

RULING
Defendant, Mountain View Hospital, Inc., through a Motion to Dismiss asks the court to
dismiss Plaintiffs cause of action for negligent credentialing with prejudice Mountain View
Hospital also asked to be dismissed as a Defendant in the matter.
This matter came before the court for oral argument on September 20, 2006. After
reviewing the submitted memorandum, oral arguments, and applicable law, the court grants
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss finding that no negligent credentialing cause of action exists in
Utah, and thereby dismissing Mountain View Hospital as a Defendant.
Factual Summary
On October 31, 2001, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendant, containing Claim IV
entitled "NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION VERSUS MOUNTAIN VIEW HOSPITAL,
INC." This claim alleges that Defendant's negligently recruited, hired, and retained Doctor Max
Cannon Plaintiffs do not allege that the hospital nurses or employees committed any negligent

act during or after the procedure that resulted in Plaintiffs claimed injuries.1
Analysis
The question presented by the parties is whether Utah recognizes negligent credentialing
as a cause of action. Based on present legislative enactments and the lack of any existing
appellate court decisions this court does not recognize Plaintiffs negligent credentialing claim. If
the claim asserted against the hospital is to be recognized in this state, it will be under the
approval of a body other than this court.
This court believes that claims for negligent credentialing are separate and distinct from
ordinary negligence claims and do not exist in common law or by statute in Utah. As to the
Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 33 I11.2d 326, 211, N.E.2d 253 (1965)
case relied on by Plaintiffs, the decision is the seminal case on negligent credentialing in Illinois
because it was the first case in Illinois to recognize such a claim. I do not believe Darling is the
law in Utah nor is its opinion binding or persuasive on this court.
Defendant rightly relies on statutory language that appears to foreclose the negligent
credentialing cause of action. Utah Code Annotated § 58-13-4 which grants immunity to health
care providers, such as Mountain View Hospital, manifests the legislatures intention to abrogate
negligent credentialing claims. Additionally, this court is persuaded by § 58-13-5(7) which
notes
An individual who is a member of a hospital administration, board,
committee, department, medical staff, or professional organization of health care
providers is, and any hospital, other health care entity, or professional
organization conducting or sponsoring the review, immune from liability arising
from participation in a review of a health care provider's professional ethics,
medical competence, moral turpitude, or substance abuse, (emphasis added).

1

Plaintiff's Complaint, October 31, 2001 at 6.

This court finds the statutory language in § 58 13 5(7) too apparent to be ignored By
immunizing conduct concerning participation in a review of a health care providers professional
ethics, this statute appears to both contemplate and deny the possibility of bringing a negligent
credentiahng cause of action
This court therefore grants the Motion and dismisses Plaintiffs negligent credentiahng
claim with prejudice In as much as this claim is the only allegation of negligence against
Mountain View Hospital the court also dismisses Mountain View Hospital as a Defendant
Counsel for Defendant shall prepare the appropriate order for the court to sign forthwith

DATED this %j day of September, 2006

In the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah
I
STEVEN J. CUNQ,etaL,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

|
I
j
|

G. REMINGTON BROOKS, M.D., et

|

a/.,

I
Defendants,

|
|

RULING

Case No. Q.5Q9I0HO
Hon. Deno G. Himonas

!

Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of Documents and Alta View Hospital's Motion
to Dismiss Claims of Negligent Credentialing and Evaluation came on for hearing on October 4,
2006. Roger Sharp appeared on behalf of plaintiffs; Brinton Burbidge and Patrick Tanner appeared
on behalf of defendant EHC Health Services, Inc., dba Alta View Hospital. Now, having heard the
arguments of counsel and reviewed the parties' written submissions, and for the reasons set forth
below, the Court grants the motion to dismiss1 and denies the motion to compel.
Plaintiffs1 Amended Complaint "includes a claim thu -,lta View was negligent in
credentialing, privileging and evaluating care related" to defend- ;• G Remington Brooks, M.D.
Memorandum in Support, p. 2. Alta View argues, quite correctly, that the plain language of the
Health Care Providers Immunity from Liability Act (Utah Code Ann. 58-13-1, etseq.}2 immunizes
it from liability on such a claim.

(

In support of its motion to dismiss, Alta View has submitted the Affidavit of William L.
Hamilton, M.D., and the Supplemental Affidavit of William L. Hamilton, M,D. Therefore, and pursuant
to Utah R. Ctv. P. 12(b), the Court treats the motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment.
"The pertinent sections are 58-1 3-4(2) and 58-1 3-5(7). They provide as follows:
(2) Health care providers serving in the following capacities and the
organizations or entities sponsoring these activities are immune from
liability with respect to deliberations, decisions, or determinations made
or information furnished in good faith and without malice:
(a) serving on committees;
(\\) established to evaluate and improve the quality of
health cure or determine whether provided health care was
necessary, appropriate, properly performed, or provided at
reasonable cost; . . . .
***
(7) (AJ. . . hospital [is] . . . immune from liability arising from
participation in a review of a health care provider's professional ethics,
medical competence, moral turpitude, or substance abuse.

Plaintiffs contend that Article f, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution (the "Open Courts
provision1') and Rees v Iniermounlain Health Care, Inc, 808 P 2d 1069 (Utah 1991), require a
different result This is not the case First, the Open Courts provision "is not implicated because
there is no abrogation of an existing claim " Reply Memorandum in Support, p. 2 And second the
Rees decision is easily distinguishable
In Rees the Utah Supreme Court held that the predecessor to Sections 58-13-4(2) and 58-135(7) was "inapplicable" to a cause of action arising out of a hospital's decision to terminate a
doctor's privileges "without acontractual due process hearing.1' Rees, 808 P.2d at I078. In reaching
this conclusion, the court noted that "the immunity statute applied only to individuals, not hospitals."
Id. It further noted that the statute was not even in effect at the operative time and that its plain
language indicated that its purpose was "to protect health care providers who furnish information
regarding the quality of health care rendered by any individual or facility." Id
None of these factors exist here. This case is a malpractice action. The statutory provisions
were in place at the time of the alleged malpractice. And the legislature has broadened the immunity
language to make it clear that it applies equally to hospitals and individuals involved in credentialing
and privileging doctors and evaluating health care.
As a consequence, the Court holds that Alta view is, as a matter of law, immune from
liability on plaintiffs' negligent credentialing and evaluation claim. T h 'vision requires that the
Court deny the motion to compel, too.
DATED this ^ " d a y of October, 2006.
BY THE COURT

